Heterogeniety and limited stock market participation by Aase, Knut K.
Discussion paper
FOR  5 2014
ISSN:  1500-4066
February  2014
INSTITUTT FOR FORETAKSØKONOMI
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Heterogeniety and limited stock
market participation
BY
Knut K. Aase
Heterogeneity and limited stock market
participation.
Knut K. Aase ∗
March 25, 2015
Abstract
We derive the equilibrium interest rate and risk premiums using re-
cursive utility with heterogeneity in a continuous time model. We solve
the associated sup-convolution problem, and obtain explicit closed
form solutions. The heterogeneous two-agent model is calibrated to
the data of Mehra and Prescott (1985) assuming the market portfo-
lio is not a proxy of the wealth portfolio. This results in plausible
values for the preference parameters of the two agents under various
assumptions for the wealth portfolio.
KEYWORDS: The equity premium puzzle, the risk-free rate puz-
zle, recursive utility, the stochastic maximum principle, heterogeneity,
limited market participation
JEL-Code: G10, G12, D9, D51, D53, D90, E21.
1 Introduction
We consider recursive utility with heterogeneity to analyze the standard
rational expectations model of Lucas (1978). We solve the resulting sup-
convolution problem, and find explicit formulas for the risk aversion and the
equilibrium interest rate. The resulting representative agent utility is not of
the standard recursive type, and can be considered as a generalized recursive
utility function.
The resulting model we adapt to address the problem with recursive util-
ity that the market portfolio is not a good proxy of the wealth portfolio.
∗The Norwegian School of Economics, 5045 Bergen, Norway. E-mail:
Knut.Aase@NHH.NO.
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As an example we calibrate the model to the US-data used by Mehra and
Prescott (1985) under various assumptions related to the wealth portfolio.
It is well known that in the economy covered by this data set only a cer-
tain fraction of the population owned stock. According to Vissing-Jørgensen
(1999) this fraction was of the order of 8-9 per cent for a large part of the
period considered. We suggest to let one agent (agent 2) represent the frac-
tion that participates in the stock market, and the other agent (agent 1) the
non-participating part of the population.
We then suppose we can view exogenous income streams as dividends of
some shadow asset, in which case our model structure is valid if the market
portfolio is expanded to include the new asset. However, as long as the latter
is not really ”traded”, the return to the wealth portfolio is not readily observ-
able or estimable from available data. Still we get a good impression of how
the model fits under various assumptions. Different scenarios are considered,
where the income portfolio of agent 1 is supposed to have volatilities lying
between the volatility of the growth rate of aggregate consumption and the
return rate of the market portfolio, and to have various correlations with the
market portfolio.
The resulting calibrations yield plausible values for the parameters of the
two recursive utility functions. Both agents are shown to prefer early resolu-
tion of uncertainty to late, and both agents have EIS larger than one. Also
the two agents seem to be remarkably similar with regards to preferences.
We consider the basic model developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992a-b)
and Duffie and Skiadas (1994), which elaborate the foundational work by
Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989) of recursive utility in
dynamic models. Guevenen (2009) considers a discrete-time model, in which
he uses Epstein-Zin utility in a heterogeneous model. He studies a richer
economy than ours, and rely on numerical solutions of the model for base
case values of the parameters. In contrast, we give exact formulas for the risk
premiums as well as for the equilibrium interest rate for the heterogeneous
model.
There is by now a long standing literature that has been utilizing recursive
preferences1.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a brief intro-
1We mention Avramov and Hore (2007), Avramov et al. (2010), Eraker and Shalias-
tovich (2009), Hansen, Heaton, Lee, Roussanov (2007), Hansen and Scheinkman (2009),
Wacther (2012), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Campbell (1996), Bansal and Yaron (2004),
Kocherlakota (1990 b), and Ai (2012) to name some important contributions. Related
work is also in Browning et al. (1999), and on consumption see Attanasio (1999). A few
exceptions to late resolution exist in this literature. Bansal and Yaron (2004) study a
richer economic environment than we employ.
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duction to recursive utility along the lines of Duffie and Epstein (1992a-b)
and Duffie and Skiadas (1994). In Section 3 we set down the first order
conditions, where we use the stochastic maximum principle. In Section 4
we we present the model for the financial market. In Section 5 we find risk
premiums and the interest rate in terms of primitives of the one-agent model,
and we connect the wealth portfolio to the primitives of the model. In Sec-
tion 6 we consider the multi agent problem, and derive the equilibrium risk
premiums and the interest rate for the heterogeneous model. In Section 7
we calibrate the model to the US-data, and Section 8 concludes. Two proofs
are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Recursive Stochastic Differentiable Utility
In this section we recall the essentials of recursive, stochastic, differentiable
utility along the lines of Duffie and Epstein (1992a-b) and Duffie and Skiadas
(1994).
We are given a probability space (Ω,F ,Ft, t ∈ [0, T ], P ) satisfying the
’usual’ conditions, and a standard model for the stock market with Brownian
motion driven uncertainty, N risky securities and one riskless asset (Section
4 provides more details). Consumption processes are chosen form the space
L of square integrable, progressively measurable processes with values in R+.
The stochastic differential utility U : L→ R is defined as follows by two
primitive functions: f : [0, T ]×R×R→ R and A : R→ R, where R are the
reals.
The function f(t, ct, Vt, ω) corresponds to a felicity index at time t, and
A corresponds to a measure of absolute risk aversion (of the Arrow-Pratt
type) for the agent. In addition to current consumption ct, the function f
also depends on utility Vt, and it may depend on time t as well as the state
of the world ω ∈ Ω.
The utility process V for a given consumption process c, satisfying VT = 0,
is given by the representation
Vt = Et
{∫ T
t
(
f(t, cs, Vs)− 1
2
A(Vs)Z(s)
′Z(s)
)
ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ] (1)
where Et(·) denotes conditional expectation given Ft and Z(t) is an Rd-
valued square-integrable progressively measurable volatility process, part of
the primitives of the model. Here d is the dimension of the Brownian motion
Bt. We think of Vt as the remaining utility for c at time t, conditional on
current information Ft, and A(Vt) is penalizing for risk.
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Recall the time-less situation with a mean zero risk X having variance
σ2, where the certainty equivalent m is defined by Eu(w +X) := u(w −m)
for a constant wealth w. Then the Arrow-Pratt approximation to m, valid
for ”small” risks, is given by m ≈ 1
2
A(w)σ2, where A(·) is the absolute risk
aversion associated with u. We would expect this analogy to work well in a
continuous-time model with Brownian driven uncertainty.
If, for each consumption process ct, there is a well-defined utility process
V , the stochastic differential utility U is defined by U(c) = V0, the initial
utility. The pair (f, A) generating V is called an aggregator.
Since VT = 0 and
∫
Z(t)dBt is assumed to be a martingale, (1) has the
stochastic differential equation representation
dVt =
(
− f(t, ct, Vt) + 1
2
A(Vt)Z(t)
′Z(t)
)
dt+ Z(t) dBt. (2)
We think of A as associated with a function h : R → R such that A(v) =
−h′′(v)
h′(v) , where h is two times continuously differentiable. U is monotonic and
risk averse if A(·) ≥ 0 and f is jointly concave and increasing in consumption.
A may also depend on time t.
The preference ordering represented by recursive utility is usually as-
sumed to satisfy A1: Dynamic consistency, in the sense of Johnsen and
Donaldson (1985), A2: Independence of past consumption, and A3: State
independence of time preference (see Skiadas (2009a)).
In this paper we consider heterogeneity with two different utility functions
of the following type: They have the Kreps-Porteus representation, which
corresponds to an aggregator with a CES specification
f(c, v) =
δ
1− ρ
c1−ρ − v1−ρ
v−ρ
and A(v) =
γ
v
. (3)
Here ρ ≥ 0, ρ 6= 1, δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, γ 6= 1 The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption ψ = 1/ρ. The parameter ρ is the time preference
parameter. This representation results in the desired, partial disentangling
of γ from ρ.
An ordinally equivalent specification also exists, but we do not make any
use of it in this paper. Its main purpose was originally to show existence
to the solution of the associated backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) (2). A uniqueness and existence proof can be found in Duffie and
Lions (1992). The ordinally equivalent version is more readily analyzed using
dynamic programming, and was analyzed by Duffie and Epstein (1992a).
However it is the above version in (3) that gives the most unambiguous
separation of risk preference from time substitution, which is the one we
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analyze in this paper. In doing so we use the stochastic maximum principle.
This approach was first used to solve the problem in Aase (2014a,b) for the
one agent model.
2.1 Homogeniety
The following result is made use of (U = U1). For a given consumption
process ct we let (V
(c)
t , Z
(c)
t ) be the solution of the BSDE{
dV
(c)
t =
(− f(t, ct, V (c)t ) + 12A(V (c)t )Z(t)′(c)Z(t)(c)) dt+ Z(t)(c) dBt
V
(c)
T = 0
(4)
Theorem 1 Assume that, for all λ > 0,
(i) λ f(t, c, v) = f(t, λc, λv); ∀ t, c, v, ω
(ii) A(λv) = 1
λ
A(v); ∀ v
Then
V
(λc)
t = λV
(c)
t and Z
(λc)
t = λZ
(c)
t , t ∈ [0, T ]. (5)
A proof can be found in Aase (2014).
Remark Note that the system need not be Markovian in general, since
we allow
f(t, c, v, ω); (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω
to be an adapted process, for each fixed c, v.
Corollary 1 Define U(c) = V
(c)
0 . Then U(λc) = λU(c) for all λ > 0.
Notice that the aggregator in (3) satisfies the assumptions of the theorem.
3 The analysis of recursive utility using the
stochastic maximum principle
In the following we indicate how to solve the consumer’s optimization prob-
lem, using the stochastic maximum principle and forward/backward stochas-
tic differential equations. The representative agent has utility function U and
endowment process e, and his problem is to solve
supc˜∈LU(c˜)
subject to
E
{∫ T
0
c˜tpitdt
}
≤ E
{∫ T
0
etpitdt
}
.
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We denote the optimal solution by c. Here Vt = V
c˜
t and (Vt, Zt) is the solution
of the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE){
dVt = −f˜(t, c˜t, Vt, Z(t)) dt+ Z(t) dBt
VT = 0.
(6)
where f˜ is given in (3), i.e.,
f˜(t, c˜t, Vt, Z(t)) := f(c˜t, Vt)− 1
2
A(Vt)Z(t)
′Z(t).
For α > 0 we define the Lagrangian
L(c˜;λ) = U(c˜)− αE
(∫ T
0
pit(c˜t − et)dt
)
.
Important is here that the quantity Z(t) is internalized. Market clearing will
finally connect the market (wealth) portfolio to Z, the latter being parts of
the primitives of the model.
Because of the generality of the problem, Aase (2014) utilize the stochastic
maximum principle (see Pontryagin (1972), Bismut (1978), Kushner (1972),
Bensoussan (1983), Øksendal and Sulem (2013), or Peng (1990)): We then
have a forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system
consisting of the simple FSDE dX(t) = 0;X(0) = 0 and the BSDE (6). The
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H(t, c˜, v, z, y) = yt f˜(t, c˜t, vt, zt)− αpit(c˜t − et) (7)
and the adjoint equation is{
dYt = Y (t)
(
∂f˜
∂v
(t, c˜t, Vt, Z(t)) dt+
∂f˜
∂z
(t, c˜t, Vt, Z(t)) dBt
)
Y0 = 1.
(8)
If c = c∗ is optimal we therefore have
Yt = exp
(∫ t
0
{∂f˜
∂v
(s, c∗s, Vs, Z(s))−
1
2
(∂f˜
∂z
(s, c∗s, Vs, Z(s))
)2}
ds
+
∫ t
0
∂f˜
∂z
(s, c∗s, Vs, Z(s)) dB(s)
)
a.s. (9)
Accordingly the adjoint variable Y is determined from the primitives of the
model. Despite the fact that the introduction of this variable will, in general,
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complicate the problem, in this case it works well as we shall see (for details
see Aase (2014)).
Maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to c˜ gives the first order equa-
tion
y
∂f˜
∂c˜
(t, c∗, v, z)− αpi = 0
or
αpit = Y (t)
∂f˜
∂c˜
(t, c∗t , V (t), Z(t)) a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (10)
Notice that the state price deflator pit at time t depends, through the adjoint
variable Yt, on the entire optimal paths (cs, Vs, Zs) for 0 ≤ s ≤ t, which
means that the economy does not display the usual Markovian structure.
For the representative agent equilibrium the optimal consumption process
c = c∗ is the given aggregate consumption (the agent’s endowment process) e
in society, and for this consumption process the utility Vt at time t is optimal.
We now review the analysis related to the aggregator given by (3), but
first we specify the model for the financial market.
4 The financial market
Having established the general recursive utility form of interest, in his section
we specify our model for the financial market. The model is much like the
one used by Duffie and Epstein (1992a), except that we do not assume any
unspecified factors in our model.
Let ν(t) ∈ RN denote the vector of expected rates of return of the N given
risky securities in excess of the riskless instantaneous return rt, and let σ(t)
denote the matrix of diffusion coefficients of the risky asset prices, normalized
by the asset prices, so that σ(t)σ(t)′ is the instantaneous covariance matrix
for asset returns. Both ν(t) and σ(t) are progressively measurable, ergodic
processes.
The representative consumer’s problem is, for each initial level w of wealth
to solve
sup
(c,ϕ)
U(c) (11)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
dWt =
(
Wt(ϕ
′
t · ν(t)) + rt)− ct
)
dt+Wtϕ
′
t · σ(t)dBt. (12)
Here ϕ′t = (ϕ
(1)
t , ϕ
(2)
t , · · · , ϕ(N)t ) are the fractions of total wealth Wt held in
the risky securities.
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Market clearing requires that ϕ′tσ(t) = (δ
W
t )
′σ(t) = σW (t) in equilibrium,
where σW (t) is the volatility of the return on the wealth portfolio, and δ
W
t
are the fractions of the different securities, j = 1, · · · , N held in the value-
weighted wealth portfolio. That is, the representative agent must hold the
wealth portfolio in equilibrium, by construction.
Generally one can not assumed that all income is investment income. In
the above we have assumed that one can view exogenous income streams
as dividends of some shadow asset, in which case our model is valid if the
market portfolio is expanded to include the new asset. In reality the latter is
not traded, so the return to the wealth portfolio is not readily observable or
estimable from available data. We indicate how the model may be slightly
adjusted under various assumptions, when the market portfolio is not a proxy
for the wealth portfolio.
5 The analysis of the recursive model
For our model, we now turn our attention to pricing restrictions relative to
the given optimal consumption plan. The first order conditions are given by
αpit = Yt
∂f
∂c
(ct, Vt) a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ] (13)
where f is given in (3). The volatility Z(t) and the utility process Vt satisfiy
the following dynamics
dVt =
(
− δ
1− ρ
c1−ρt − V 1−ρt
V −ρt
+
1
2
γ
Vt
Z ′(t)Z(t)
)
dt+ Z(t)dBt (14)
where V (T ) = 0. This is the backward equation for the ordinal model.
Aggregate consumption c = e is exogenous in the Lucas model, with
dynamics on of the form
dct
ct
= µc(t) dt+ σc(t) dBt, (15)
where µc(t) and σc(t) are measurable, Ft adapted stochastic processes, satis-
fying appropriate integrability properties. We assume these processes to be
ergodic, so that we may ’replace’ (estimate) time averages by state averages.
The function f˜ of Section 3 is given by
f˜(t, c, v, z) = f(c, v)− 1
2
A(v)z′z,
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and since A(v) = γ/v, from (8) the adjoint variable Y has dynamics
dYt = Yt
({ ∂
∂v
f(ct, Vt) +
1
2
γ
V 2t
Z ′(t)Z(t)
}
dt− A(Vt)Z(t) dBt
)
, (16)
where Y (0) = 1. From the FOC in (13) we get the dynamics of the state
price deflator. We use the notation Z(t)/V (t) = σV (t), valid for V 6= 0.
By Theorem 1 the term σV (t) is homogeneous of order zero in c. Sufficient
assumptions guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of the solution of the
stochastic maximum principle are the same as the ones for the BSDE (6).
Given Vt and σV (t), we then seek the determination of risk premiums
and the short rate in equilibrium. Notice that Y is an unbounded variation
process, so by Ito’s lemma
dpit = fc(ct, Vt) dYt + Yt dfc(ct, Vt) + dYtdfc(ct, Vt). (17)
From this one can show that
σpi(t) = pit
(
(ρ− γ)σV (t)− ρσc(t)
)
, (18)
where σV (t) is the volatility of the growth rate of the utility process V, here
a primitive of the model.
This relationship gives the connection between ”prices” and primitives of
the model, which are utility and consumption, the latter because we consider
a pure exchange economy, where aggregate consumption is given exogenously.
The risk premium of any risky security with return process denoted by R
is in general given by
µR(t)− rt = − 1
pit
σpi(t)σR(t). (19)
By (18) it follows that this risk premium is
µR(t)− rt = ρ σc(t)σR(t) + (γ − ρ)σV (t)σR(t), (20)
The volatility of the utility process V , is a primitive of the model, but not
readily observed. Later we show how to link this quantity to observables.
The equilibrium short-term, real interest rate rt is given in general given
by the formula
rt = −µpi(t)
pit
. (21)
The real interest rate at time t can be thought of as the expected exponential
rate of decline of the representative agent’s marginal value, which is pit in
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equilibrium. From the relationship (17) we can also show that
rt = δ + ρµc(t)− 1
2
ρ(ρ+ 1)σ′c(t)σc(t)−
ρ(γ − ρ)σcV (t)− 1
2
(γ − ρ)(1− ρ)σ′V (t)σV (t). (22)
We proceed to connect the wealth portfolio to the utility process V .
5.1 The volatility of of the wealth portfolio
In order to determine link the stochastic process of the wealth portfolio to
primitives of the economy, first notice that the wealth at any time t is given
by
Wt =
1
pit
Et
(∫ T
t
pisc
∗
s ds
)
. (23)
From Theorem 1 it follows that the nonordinal utility function U(= U1) is
homogenous of degree one. By the definition of directional derivatives we
have that
5 U(c∗; c∗) = limα↓0U(c
∗ + αc∗)− U(c∗)
α
= limα↓0
U(c∗(1 + α))− U(c∗)
α
= limα↓0
(1 + α)U(c∗)− U(c∗)
α
= limα↓0
αU(c∗)
α
= U(c∗),
where the third equality uses that U is homogeneous of degree one. By the
Riesz representation theorem it follows from the linearity and continuity of
the directional derivative that
5U(c∗; c∗) = E
(∫ T
0
pitc
∗
t dt
)
= W0pi0 (24)
where W0 is the wealth of the representative agent at time zero, and the last
equality follows from (23) for t = 0. Thus U(c∗) = pi0W0.
From the market clearing condition in (12) it follows that ϕ′tσ(t) =
(δWt )
′σ(t) = σW (t) in equilibrium, where δWt are the fractions of the different
securities, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , held in the value-weighted wealth portfolio.
Here we have made the assumption that we can view exogenous income
streams as dividends of some shadow asset, so that our model is valid if
the market portfolio is expanded to include the new asset. In this case
ϕ′tσ(t) = (δ
W
t )
′σ(t) = σW (t) in equilibrium, where σW (t) is the volatility of
the return rate on the value-weighted wealth portfolio.
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Let Vt = V
(c∗t ) denote utility at time t for the optimal consumption.
Since also Vt is homogeneous of degree one and continuously differentiable,
by Riesz’ representation theorem and the dominated convergence theorem,
the same type of basic relationship holds here for the associated directional
derivatives at any time t, i.e.,
5Vt(c∗; c∗) = Et
(∫ T
t
pi(t)s c
∗
s ds
)
= Vt
where pi
(t)
s for s ≥ t is the state price deflator at time s ≥ t, as of time t. As
for the discrete time model, with assumption A2, the consumption history
in the adjoint variable Yt is simply ’removed’ from the state price deflator pit,
so that pi
(t)
s = pis/Yt for all t ≤ s ≤ T .
It is then the case that
Vt =
1
Yt
pitWt. (25)
This relationship connects the dynamics of W to the primitives in the econ-
omy. First rewrite this as
VtYt = pitWt,
which, by the product rule gives
YtdVt + VtdYt + dVtdYt = Wtdpit + pitdWt + dpitdWt.
From this relationship we find the following connection between the various
volatilities involved:
YtVtσV (t) + VtYtσY (t) = Wtpit
σpi(t)
pit
+ pitWtσW (t),
or, using (25)
σV (t) + σY (t) =
σpi(t)
pit
+ σW (t).
From (16) and (18) we have
σV (t)− γσV (t) = (ρ− γ)σV (t)− ρσc(t) + σW (t).
Thus
σW (t) = (1− ρ)σV (t) + ρσc(t).
As promised, this links the main characteristic of the stochastic process of
the market portfolio, its volatility process, to the corresponding volatility
processes of utility and the aggregate consumption process. This result was
shown in Aase (2014).
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The interesting application of this is now obtained by turning this equality
around, and expressing the ’unknown’ σV (t) in terms of the ’observables’
σW (t) and σc(t) as follows:
σV (t) =
1
1− ρ(σW (t)− ρσc(t)). (26)
This expression may now be inserted into (20) and (22), in which case the
’unobservable’ σV (t) becomes replaced by σc(t) which we have estimates for,
and σW (t). The latter quantity may not be readily observable from available
data, but we can at least present various scenarios for this quantity.
5.2 The optimal consumption
Later we will need the optimal consumption of each participant in the econ-
omy in order to formulate the budget constraints, which will determine the
agent weights λi in a heterogeneous model. When the agent takes the state
price pit as given, then the optimal consumption c is given in terms of the
state price pit by
ct = c0pi
− 1
ρ
t e
∫ t
0 (− δρ+ 12ρ (γ−ρ)(1−γ)σ′V (s)σV (s))ds+ 1ρ (ρ−γ)
∫ t
0 σV (s) dBs . (27)
As we shall se below, c0 depends on the agent weights, meaning that the
budget constraints determine these weights (modulo a constant).
6 Heterogeneity in preferences
From the above results, it seems reasonable to study a model with heterogene-
ity containing two agents with recursive utility having different parameters.
A one-agent model has been shown to fit the data in isolation with reasonable
parameter values, in particular when the market portfolio is not considered
as a proxy for the wealth portfolio (Aase (2015a,b)). We then naturally ex-
pect that a model with two different agents will explain the data even better.
This allows us to present an economy consisting of two groups of people, one
more exposed to stock market uncertainty than the other. This is what we
formalize next.
6.1 The Arrow-Debreu economy
In this section we derive an Arrow-Debreu markets equilibrium in which each
agent has a recursive utility function Ui of the type we have considered in this
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paper. As in Duffie (1986) there exists an implementation of such equilibria
is the setting with security and spot markets only, given an appropriate
set of admissible trading strategies and a spanning assumption on nominal
cumulative dividend processes.
As we shall simply calculate the relevant equilibrium, we do not really
employ the theorems for such equilibria to exist, but there is a theory for
recursive preferences in this regard that should be consulted (Duffie, Geoffard
and Skiadas (1994)).
The situation is as follows: Given an initial allocation (e1, e2, . . . , em) ∈
Lm, an m-dimensional Ito process, with e =
∑
i e
i, an equilibrium is a feasible
allocation (c1, c2, . . . , cm) and a non-zero linear price functional Π : L → R
such that, for all i, ci solves the problem
maxc∈LUi(c) subject to Π(c) ≤ Π(ei) (28)
By assuming there is no arbitrage possibilities in this market of Arrow-Debreu
securities, the price functional is strictly positive on L, hence it is bounded,
and thus also continuous. By the Riesz’ Representation Theorem there is an
element pi ∈ L, the Riesz Representation, such that Π(c) = E( ∫ T
0
pitct
)
for
any c ∈ L.
Under certain smoothness conditions on the aggregator (f, A), there ex-
ists an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (Π, (c1, c2, . . . , cm)) having the following
properties:
(i) (c1, c2, . . . , cm) is Pareto optimal.
(ii) For each i, Ui has a gradient at c
i with a Riesz Representation pii(c
i)
given by the stochastic maximum principle in (10). The FOC in the hetero-
geneous model is now
Y it
∂f i
∂c
(cit, V
i
t ) = αipit a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, · · · . (29)
(iii) The state price deflator pit = λipii(t), i = 1, 2, · · · .
The conditions (ii) and (iii) can be considered as a version of Borch’s char-
acterization of Pareto optimality in a one-period (time-less) setting (Borch
(1960-62)).
Equality in the budget constraints determine the constants αi as a func-
tion of the preferences of the agents and the joint probability distributions of
the initial endowments and the state price deflator. The Lagrange multipliers
in each agent’s optimization problem, αi =
1
λi
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, where λi
are the agent weights appearing in the function Uλ(c) =
∑m
i=1 λi Ui(c
i). This
function be thought of as the utility function of the representative agent, here
as a generalized recursive utility function, where ct :=
∑m
i=1 c
i
t =
∑m
0=1 e
i
t :=
et. In the following section we confine ourselves to the case of m = 2.
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The fourth property of an equilibrium determines the agent weights λi
from the budget constraints, modulo a constant, as follows
(iv) The constants λi are determined from
E
( ∫ T
0
c
(i)
t pitdt
)
= E
( ∫ T
0
e
(i)
t pitdt
)
, i = 1, 2,
where
c
(i)
t = c
(i)
0 pii(t)
− 1
ρ e
∫ t
0 (−
δi
ρi
+ 1
2ρi
(γi−ρi)(1−γi)σ′Vi (s)σVi (s))ds+
1
ρi
(ρi−γi)
∫ t
0 σVi (s) dBs
and
c
(i)
0 = (λiδi)
1
ρiUi(c
(i)), i = 1, 2.
The latter follows from the first order conditions, since
c
(i)
t = (δi Y
(i)
t )
1
ρi Vi(t) (αipit)
− 1
ρi , i = 1, 2,
and the above expression follows assuming pi0 = 1, recallling that Ui(c
(i)) =
Vi(0), i = 1, 2.
6.2 Heterogeneity with U1 and U2
We imagine that the market consists of two groups of people, both with
recursive preferences which can have different parameters, and we want to
characterize the resulting Pareto optimal equilibrium.
We denote c
(i)
t /ct as the fraction of the aggregate consumption consumed
by agent i at time t, i = 1, 2. We show how to determine the optimal
consumptions c
(i)
t of the two agents below.
For the markets to clear, it must be the case that
Wtϕ
W (t)σ(t) =
(
W1(t)ϕ1(t) +W2ϕ2(t)
)
σ(t),
where Wi(t) is the wealth of agent i at time t, and ϕi(t) is agent i’s fraction
in the different securities held at time t in equilibrium, i = 1, 2. We then use
the notation σWi(t) = ϕi(t)σ(t), i = 1, 2.
For the heterogeneous economy the following relationship between the
directional derivatives holds: Assuming c, c(1) and c(2 optimal
5U(c; c) = λ15 U1(c(1); c(1)) + λ25 U2(c(2); c(2)) =
λ1U1(c
(1)) + λ2U2(c
(2))
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where the equality follows from homogeneity of U1 and U2. Accordingly U is
also homogeneous of degree one in consumption. Recall that
Wi(0) =
1
pi0
E
( ∫ T
0
c
(i)
t pitdt
)
, i = 1, 2,
and that pii(t) = αipit, i = 1, 2. Now
5Ui(c(i); c(i)) = E
( ∫ T
0
c
(i)
t pii(t) dt
)
= αiWi(0)pi0, i = 1, 2,
It follows that
5U(c; c) = W1(0)pi0 +W2(0)pi0 = W (0)pi0
since λi αi = 1, i = 1, 2.
Moving to time t > 0 we have
Wi(t) =
1
pit
Et
( ∫ T
t
c(i)s pisds
)
, i = 1, 2.
Also it follows from (25) in Section 5.1 that the linear functional 5Vi(t)(·, ·)
has Riesz-representation pi
(t)
i (s) = pii(s)/Yi(t) for s ≥ t, so that
5Vi(t)(c(i); c(i)) = Et
(∫ T
t
pi
(t)
i (s)c
(i)
s ds
)
=
αipit
Yi(t)
Wi(t) =
pii(t)
Yi(t)
Wi(t).
Accordingly
5Vt(c; c) = λ15 V1(t)(c(1); c(1)) + λ25 V2(t)(c(2); c(2)) =
λ1V1(t)(c
(1)) + λ2V2(t)(c
(2)) = λ1
pi1(t)W1(t)
Y1(t)
+ λ2
pi2(t)W2(t)
Y2(t)
where the second equality follows from of homogeneity, the third from the
above. Thus
Vi(t) =
pii(t)Wi(t)
Yi(t)
, i = 1, 2. (30)
As in Section 5.1, this leads directly to
σVi(t) =
σpii(t)
pii(t)
+ σWi(t)− σYi(t), i = 1, 2, (31)
This means that the wealth processes of the agents are endogeneized as fol-
lows
σWi(t) = (1− ρi)σVi(t) + ρiσci(t), i = 1, 2.
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Also
σVi(t) =
1
1− ρi
(
σWi(t)− ρiσci(t)
)
, i = 1, 2. (32)
We now have a homogeneous Vt, a well defined pit and Wt. Does this mean
there is a well defined adjoint process Yt for the representative agent? If so,
has this agent a recursive utility of the type we consider? A little algebra
shows that such Y must satisfy
Yt =
Y1(t)Y2(t)W (t)
W1(t)Y2(t) +W2(t)Y1(t)
,
which means that the representative agent is not in this class2.
6.3 The risk premium with heterogeneity
Our first result concerns the risk premium in the heterogeneous economy:
Theorem 2 The risk premium of a risky asset denoted R has the following
representation
µR(t)− rt = 1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t)σR(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t)σR(t)
+
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)σR(t)
)
, (33)
where the average value of the population EIS (ψi = 1/ρi) is
ψ¯t :=
1
ρ1
(c(1)t
ct
)
+
1
ρ2
(c(2)t
ct
)
, (34)
the average time preference is
ρ¯t := ρ1
(c(1)t
ct
)
+ ρ2
(c(2)t
ct
)
,
and where Vi(t) are given in (32).
For proof of Theorem 2, see the Appendix.
Remarks
1) Since the harmonic mean is smaller than or equal to the arithmetic mean,
2This is not to be expected; for the conventional model with CRRA utility, the solution
of the sup-convolution problem is not of the CRRA-type either.
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it follows that 1/ψ¯t ≤ ρ¯t.
2) In the special situation that ϕ1(t) = ϕ2(t) for all t, both agents hold the
wealth portfolio in the same proportions relative to their own wealth in equi-
librium, in which case σWi(t) = σW (t) for i = 1, 2 in (32).
3) When c
(1)
t = ct for all t a.s., then (33) reduces to the risk premium in
Section 5 derived for one single agent. When γ1 = ρ1 and γ2 = ρ2, then (33)
reduces to the risk premium of the conventional model with two heteroge-
neous agents.
6.4 The equilibrium interest rate with heterogeneity
Our next result concerns the equilibrium interest rate in the heterogeneous
economy:
Theorem 3 The equilibrium short rate for the heterogeneous model is given
by the following expression
rt = δ¯
(ρ)
t +
1
ψ¯t
µc(t)
− 1
2
1
ψ¯t
{ 1
ψ¯2t
((c(1)t
ct
) 1
ρ1
(
1 + ρ1
ρ1
)+
c
(2)
t
ct
1
ρ2
(
1 + ρ2
ρ2
)
)(
σc(t)+
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t)
+
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)2}
− 1
ψ¯2t
{(c(1)t
ct
) ρ1 − γ1
ρ21
(
σc(t)+
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t)+
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)
σV1(t)
+
(c(2)t
ct
) ρ2 − γ1
ρ22
(
σc(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)
σV2(t)
}
− 1
2
1
ψ¯t
{(c(1)t
ct
) ρ1 − γ1
ρ1
γ1
ρ1 − 1
ρ1
σV1(t)
2 +
(c(2)t
ct
) ρ2 − γ2
ρ2
γ2
ρ2 − 1
ρ2
σV2(t)
2
}
,
(35)
where the population impatience rate is given by
δ¯
(ρ)
t :=
1
ψ¯t
2∑
i=1
(
c
(i)
t
ct
)(
δi
ρi
). (36)
For proof of Theorem 3, see the Appendix.
Remarks
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1) When δ1 = δ2 := δ, then δ¯
(ρ)
t = δ for all t.
2) When c
(1)
t ≡ ct, then (35) reduces to the interest rate presented in Sec-
tion 5 for the single agent economy. When γ1 = ρ1 and γ2 = ρ2, then (35)
reduces to the equilibrium interest rate in the conventional model with two
heterogeneous agents.
In the above, referring to the representative agent (U, e), where U =
λ1U1 + λ2U2 and e = e1 + e2, the quantity ρ¯t can be interpreted as time
preference, ψ¯t the EIS, and δ¯
(ρ)
t the impatience rate of this agent, where
1/ψ¯t ≤ ρ¯t.
6.5 The conventional model with heterogeneity.
We obtain the conventional model by setting γ1 = ρ1 and γ2 = ρ2. From (33)
this gives the equilibrium risk premium
µR(t)− rt = 1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t)σR(t)
)
, (37)
where
ψ¯t :=
1
γ1
(c(1)t
ct
)
+
1
γ2
(c(2)t
ct
)
,
and the equilibrium short term interest rate follows from (35)
rt = δ¯
(γ)
t +
1
ψ¯t
µc(t)− 1
2
1
ψ¯3t
(c(1)t
ct
1
γ1
(
1 + γ1
γ1
)+
c
(2)
t
ct
1
γ2
(
1 + γ2
γ2
)
)
σ′c(t)σc(t). (38)
When i = 1 these expressions reduce to the standard ones for the conventional
one-agent model
µR(t)− rt = γσc,R(t)
and
rt = δ + γµc(t)− 1
2
γ(1 + γ)σ′c(t)σc(t).
From the expression for the risk premium we notice that the two-agent model
has the same problem as the one-agent model to explain the large observed
risk premium, since the covariance rate between the consumption growth
rate and the return rate on the market portfolio is still the same, while the
term
1/ψ¯t ≤ γ¯t := γ1
(c(1)t
ct
)
+ γ2
(c(2)t
ct
)
,
making the problem even more difficult than for the one agent model, i.e.,
the two-agent model risk premium is not larger, and can be smaller. Thus
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we conclude that heterogeneity in itself does not solve the equity premium
puzzle for the conventional model.
7 Some calibrations of the heterogeneous
model
In these sections we give a description of some situations in which the empir-
ical relevance of the above theory can be tested. This we do by calibrating
our resulting model to market data. In Table 1 we present the Mehra and
Prescott (1985) key summary statistics of the real annual return data related
to the S&P-500, denoted by M , as well as for the annualized consumption
data, denoted c, and the government bills, denoted b 3.
Since our development is in continuous time, we have carried out stan-
dard adjustments for continuous-time compounding, from discrete-time com-
pounding. The results of these operations are presented in Table 1 4. This
gives, e.g., the estimate κˆM,c = .4033 for the instantaneous correlation coef-
ficient κc,M(t) between the consumption growth rate and the return on the
S&P-500 index.
Expectation Standard dev. Covariances
Consumption growth 1.81% 3.55% σˆMc = .002268
Return S&P-500 6.78% 15.84% σˆMb = .001477
Government bills 0.80% 5.74% σˆcb = −.000149
Equity premium 5.98% 15.95%
Table 1: Key US-data for the time period 1889-1978. Continuous-time com-
pounding.
We interpret the risky asset as the value weighted market portfolio M
corresponding to the S&P-500 index.
7.1 The base case for the parameters of the wealth
portfolio
To demonstrate our results, assume that agent 1 (the public at large) con-
sumes 80 per cent of the total consumption, σc1 = σc2 = 0.0355 and σW1 =
3There are of course newer data by now, but these retain the same basic features. If we
can explain the data in Table 1, we can explain any of the newer sets as well. We obtained
the full data set from R. Mehra.
4The overall changes are in principle small, and do not influence our comparisons to
any significant degree, but are still important.
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.04. We take σW2 = σM = .1584 in the calibrations. For the various correla-
tions we assume the following: κW1,M = .5, κc1,M = κc2,M = .4, κc1,c2 = .8,
κc1,W1 = κc2,W1 = .4.
One view is that the consumption growth of non-stockholders covaries
with the stock return in the same way as the consumption growth of stock-
holders (e.g., Vissing-Jørgensen (1999)). There are also arguments why con-
sumption growth of non-stockholders is less correlated with stock returns
than that of stockholders. Below we adhere to the former view. Then we
obtain:
γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ¯ = .000 2.60 .50 1.76 .95
δ¯ = .010 2.60 .50 2.24 .92
δ¯ = .015 2.60 .50 2.48 .91
δ¯ = .020 2.30 .55 2.24 .91
δ¯ = .025 2.00 .75 2.09 .90
δ¯ = .030 2.00 .75 2.37 .87
δ¯ = .035 2.00 .75 2.65 .83
δ¯ = .040 2.00 .75 2.92 .80
δ¯ = .045 2.00 .65 3.11 .82
δ¯ = .050 1.90 .65 3.17 .81
Table 2: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .04; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ¯ = .000 2.61 .51 1.80 .95
δ¯ = .010 2.35 .53 1.80 .95
δ¯ = .015 2.63 .71 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .020 2.39 .73 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .025 2.11 .77 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .030 1.84 .81 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .035 1.56 .85 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .040 1.27 .90 2.00 .90
δ¯ = .045 1.71 .51 1.90 .95
δ¯ = .050 1.61 .51 1.90 .95
Table 3: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .04; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
In Table 2 we consider a situation where γ2 and ρ2 are determined as γ1
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and ρ1 are pre-determined, while δ¯
(ρ)
t vary between zero and five per cent,
such that (33) matches the estimated equity premium of 5.98% and (35)
matches the short rate of .0080 for the period considered, together with the
rest of the summary statistics of Table 1, and the above choice for the rest
of the parameters.
In Table 3 we similarly determine γ1 and ρ1 as γ2 and ρ2 are pre-determined,
while δ¯
(ρ)
t varies as before.
Typically for both agents γi > ρi so that they both prefer early resolution
of uncertainty to late. Also ρi < 1, for i = 1, 2, so the EIS-parameters ψi > 1.
The values of the parameters of the utility functions in both tables seem
rather plausible.
We can also find calibrated values where ρi > 1 for one of the agents (not
shown in the tables), but this we find less plausible.
From the tables it is unclear which of the agents is the more risk averse,
since this varies with the values of δ¯
(ρ)
t . Because of the nature of this latter
parameter, we do not distinguish between δ1 and δ2, but the tables can of
course be used to do just that. From the tables it follows that the EIS of
agent 1 is the largest of the two. We may think of agent 1 representing ”the
public at large”. Thus, the part of the population not in the stock market
seem better able to tolerate deterministic variations in consumption across
time. This could be because this group is not that much exposed to risk as
group 2.
One would perhaps presume that agent 1 should have the higher risk
aversion of the two, since this agent avoids the stock market. This argument
hinges on a self-selection perspective that we don not assume here. For
certain values of δ¯
(ρ)
t agent 1 is more risk averse than agent 2, for example
for an (overall) impatience rate in the range from 0.0 to 2.5 per cent in Table
3, and for an impatience rate in the range from 0.0 to 2.0 per cent in Table
2. These are, perhaps, the most plausible ranges for the impatience rates.
The preference ”parameters” of the representative agent can also be cal-
culated. As an example, for the the fourth row of Table 2 we obtain the
values:
ρ¯t = .62, ψ¯t = 1.67, γ¯t = 2.28 and δ¯
(ρ)
t = .02,
so the representative agent has γ¯t = 2.28 > ρ¯t = .62. Also 1/ψ¯t = 0.60 <
ρ¯t = 0.62.
The representative agent of the fourth row in Table 3 has parameters
ρ¯t = .76, ψ¯t = 1.32, γ¯t = 2.31 and δ¯
(ρ)
t = .02.
Here γ¯t = 2.31 > ρ¯t = .76, and 1/ψ¯t = 0.757 < ρ¯t = 0.760.
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In conclusion, the calibrations in Tables 2 and 3 present us with rather
reasonable scenarios for the parameters of the two utility functions, where
agent 1 has the highest EIS of the two, and is also most risk averse for
plausible values of the impatience rates. Figure 1 illustrates for the points
corresponding to δ¯
(ρ)
t = .020 in Table 3. The middle point represents the
corresponding representative agent in the last row above.
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Figure 1: Calibration points in the (γ, ρ)-space
7.2 Some other values for the parameters characteriz-
ing the wealth portfolio
Next we try some other values for σW1 and κW1,M . We start with σW1 = .08
and κW1,M = .7. As before we take σW2 = σM = .1584 in the calibrations.
For the various correlations we assume the following: κc1,M = κc2,M = .4,
κc1,c2 = .8, κc1,W1 = κc2,W1 = .4, the same as in the last section. The results
of the calibrations are shown in tables 4 and 5.
In Table 4 we consider a situation where γ1 and ρ1 are determined as γ2
and ρ2 are pre-determined, while δ¯
(ρ)
t varies between zero and five per cent,
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 1.64 .32 2.20 .95
δ = .010 1.56 .33 2.20 .95
δ = .015 1.52 .33 2.20 .95
δ = .020 1.48 .33 2.20 .95
δ = .025 1.43 .34 2.20 .95
δ = .030 1.39 .34 2.20 .95
δ = .035 1.35 .34 2.20 .95
δ = .040 1.31 .35 2.20 .95
δ = .045 1.27 .35 2.20 .95
δ = .050 1.23 .35 2.20 .95
Table 4: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .08; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
such that (33) matches the estimated equity premium of 5.98% and (35)
matches the short rate of .0080 for the period considered, together with the
rest of the summary statistics of Table 1, and the above choice for the rest
of the parameters.
In Table 5 we similarly determine γ2 and ρ2 as γ1 and ρ1 are pre-determined,
while δ¯
(ρ)
t varies as before.
Typically for both agents γi > ρi so that they both prefer early resolution
of uncertainty to late. Also ρi < 1, so that the EIS-parameters ψi > 1. Again,
these values all seem rather plausible.
From both tables we notice that agent 2 is more risk averse. In Table 4
agent 2 has lower EIS that agent 1, while in Table 3 this is reversed.
For the agent not in the stock market, one would perhaps presume the
higher risk aversion of the two. In contrast to the results of the previous sec-
tion, our calibrations for these parameter values indicate the opposite. There
could of course be several reasons other than differences in risk aversion why
some consumers do not invest in the stock market for the period considered.
For many ordinary people the stock market may have appeared as something
for the elite, that did not concern them. Also ordinary people may not have
much to invest in this market. On the other hand, many ordinary people like
gambling (e.g., they visit Las Vegas). 5
From the discrete time model we know that the impatience rate of the
agent increases with the return rate on the wealth portfolio in similar calibra-
tions. Recalling the expression for the impatience rate of the representative
5However, ”gambling” at this level may often be attributed to entertainment, hence
consumption, and have little to do with risk aversion.
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 1.40 .95 2.04 .20
δ = .010 1.40 .95 1.97 .25
δ = .015 1.40 .95 1.89 .30
δ = .020 1.50 .95 1.95 .12
δ = .025 1.50 .95 1.93 .12
δ = .030 1.50 .95 1.91 .13
δ = .035 1.50 .95 1.89 .14
δ = .040 1.50 .95 1.86 .14
δ = .045 1.50 .95 1.83 .15
δ = .050 1.50 .95 1.79 .16
Table 5: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .08; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
agent,
δ¯
(ρ)
t =
1
ψ¯t
2∑
i=1
(
c
(i)
t
ct
)(
δi
ρi
),
we notice that the agent in the stock market obtains a large weight on his
impatience rate δ2 when ρ2 is small, which may be an explanation for the
good fit for relatively large values of δ¯
(ρ)
t in Table 5.
In conclusion, the calibrations in Tables 4 and 5 present us with two
scenarios, one in which agent 1 has an EIS of around 2.9, while agent 2 has
an EIS of around 1.05, the other where agent 1 has an EIS of 1.05 while agent
2 varies between 4 and 8. In both tables agent 2 is the most risk averse of
the two. Both scenarios, and all the parameters seem plausible.
Compared to the results of the last section, the latter were slightly more
consistent, but the scenarios in both sections yield plausible results.
7.2.1 Increasing σW1(t) to .10
In tables 6 and 7 the volatility σW1(t) = .10. The results are similar to
those of tables 4 and 5, except that in Table 7 the risk aversion of agent 1
is higher than in the corresponding Table 5. This may reflect that agent 1
now requires a higher rate of return on the part of the wealth portfolio that
he/she invests in.
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 1.44 .31 2.20 .95
δ = .010 1.37 .32 2.20 .95
δ = .015 1.33 .32 2.20 .95
δ = .020 1.30 .32 2.20 .95
δ = .025 1.26 .33 2.20 .95
δ = .030 1.23 .33 2.20 .95
δ = .035 1.20 .34 2.20 .95
δ = .040 1.16 .34 2.20 .95
δ = .045 1.10 .41 2.40 .93
δ = .050 1.06 .41 2.40 .93
Table 6: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .10; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
7.2.2 The market portfolio as a proxy for the wealth portfolio.
Finally we test out the situation, often taken for granted, that the market
portfolio may serve as a proxy for the wealth portfolio. In this situation the
choice of the parameters are as follows:
σW1 = σW2 = σM = .1584, and κW1,M = κW2,M = 1.0. As before we take
κc1,M = κc2,M = .4, κc1,c2 = .8, κc1,W1 = κc2,W1 = .4, the same as in the last
sections. The results of the calibrations are shown in tables 8 and 9.
These calibrations essentially present us with two scenarios, one in which
agent 1 has relative risk aversion less than one, while agent 2 has risk aversion
above two, the other where agent 1 has an risk aversion above two while agent
2 has risk aversion a little above one. In both scenarios the agents prefer
early resolution of uncertainty to late, and both agents have EIS larger than
one. Both scenarios represent reasonable values of the preference parameters,
although we think that best fit is still represented in the base case of Section
7.1. For example does the EIS of agent 2 in Table 9 seem a bit large, and
the relative risk aversions of agent 1 in Table 8 seems a bit low.
Our results are supported by calibrating the one-agent model with recur-
sive utility to market data using a continuous-time approach (Aase (2014)),
as well as in the discrete time model of the Epstein-Zin-type (Aase (2013).
A variety of other scenarios are possible. We have varied the parame-
ters within feasible ranges, and demonstrated that the recursive model with
heterogeneity can explain the data with reasonable parameter values for the
utility functions.
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 2.20 .95 2.16 .01
δ = .010 2.00 .85 1.92 .14
δ = .015 2.00 .85 1.88 .15
δ = .020 2.00 .85 1.02 .57
δ = .025 2.00 .85 1.18 .45
δ = .030 1.00 .93 2.38 .85
δ = .035 1.00 .93 2.76 .80
δ = .040 1.70 .90 1.60 .24
δ = .045 1.75 .90 1.73 .16
δ = .050 1.75 .90 1.68 .17
Table 7: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .10; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
8 Conclusions
We have considered recursive utility with heterogeneity to analyze the stan-
dard rational expectations model of Lucas (1978). In this setting we derive
equilibrium risk premiums of risky securities and the equilibrium interest
rate. The resulting model we adapt to address the problem that the market
portfolio may not be a reliable proxy of the wealth portfolio. As an example
we calibrate the model to the US-data used by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
It is well known that in the economy covered by these data only a cer-
tain fraction of the population owned stock. According to Vissing-Jørgensen
(1999) this fraction was of the order of 8-9% for a large part of the period
considered. We suggest to let agent 2 represent the fraction that participates
in the stock market, and agent 1 the non-participating part of the population.
We then suppose we can view exogenous income streams as dividends of
some shadow asset, in which case our model structure is valid if the market
portfolio is expanded to include the new asset. However, as long as the
latter is not really ”traded”, the return to the wealth portfolio is not readily
observable or estimable from available data. Still we get a good impression of
how the model fits under different, realistic assumptions. Various scenarios
are considered, where the income portfolio of agent 1 is supposed to have
volatilities lying between the volatility of aggregate consumption and the
market portfolio, and to have either low, or high correlations with the market
portfolio.
The resulting calibrations to market data gives plausible values for the
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 .88 .34 2.40 .93
δ = .010 .82 .30 2.20 .95
δ = .015 .81 .30 2.20 .95
δ = .020 .86 .66 2.20 .90
δ = .025 .85 .67 2.20 .90
δ = .030 .90 .80 2.50 .85
δ = .035 .90 .83 2.50 .85
δ = .040 .90 .86 2.50 .85
δ = .045 .92 .90 2.50 .85
δ = .050 .94 .93 2.50 .85
Table 8: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .1584; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
parameters of the utility functions. The data are consistent with a situation
where both agents prefer early resolution of uncertainty to late, and where
both agents have EIS larger than one. The relative risk aversions of the agents
are of moderate size, as are both the time preferences and the impatience
rates. The preference parameters did not change much when the population
parameters changed. The situation with the lowest volatility for the wealth
portfolio of the agent not in the stock market did fit the data particularly
well.
We have not made any specific hypotheses about differences between the
agents in terms of the parameters in the preferences. These parameters are
in relative terms, and should be unaffected by e.g., wealth levels. Since our
analysis produce explicit, closed form expressions for risk premiums as well
as the short rate, researchers may find these results as good starting points
for testing various hypotheses of this kind.
9 Appendix
THE RISK PREMIUMS AND THE SHORT RATE FOR THE HETERO-
GENEOUS MODEL. PROOFS.
In this section we prove theorems 2 and 3, the results for the risk premiums
and the short rate for heterogeneous model.
The methods used here are somewhat different from the ones used in the
rest of the paper, since we have to find the optimal consumption for both
agents separately. To this end, consider the expression for the aggregate
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γ1 ρ1 γ2 ρ2
δ = .000 2.20 .50 1.40 .13
δ = .010 2.20 .50 1.29 .14
δ = .015 2.20 .50 1.24 .15
δ = .020 2.20 .50 1.17 .16
δ = .025 2.20 .50 1.10 .17
δ = .030 2.20 .55 1.18 .14
δ = .035 2.30 .50 1.14 .14
δ = .040 2.30 .50 1.09 .15
δ = .045 2.30 .50 1.02 .15
δ = .050 2.40 .50 1.14 .12
Table 9: Calibrations Consistent with Table 1;
σW1 = .1584; c
(1)
t /ct = 4/5.
consumption ct = c
(1)
t + c
(2)
t , where c
(i) is optimal for agent i, i = 1, 2. It
follows from the first order conditions in (29) that
ct = (δ1 Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1 V1(t) (α1pit)
− 1
ρ1 + (δ2 Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2 V2(t) (α2pit)
− 1
ρ2 . (39)
The state price deflator pi has dynamics
dpit = µpi(t)dt+ σpi(t)dBt (40)
We now develop the dynamic equation for the aggregate consumption.
From the above we get, using Ito’s lemma
dct = ctµc(t)dt+ ctσc(t)dBt =
d
((
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1
)
V1(t)(α1pit)
− 1
ρ1 +
(
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1 d(V1(t))(α1pit)
− 1
ρ1
+
(
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1 V1(t)d(α1pi
− 1
ρ1
t ) +
(
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1 d(V1(t)α1pi
− 1
ρ1
t )
+(α1pit)
− 1
ρ1 d
((
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1 (V1(t)
)
+ (V1(t))d
(
δ1Y
(1)
t )
1
ρ1α1pi
− 1
ρ1
t
)
d
((
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2
)
V2(t)(α2pit)
− 1
ρ2 +
(
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2 d(V2(t))(α2pit)
− 1
ρ1
+
(
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2 V2(t)d(α2pi
− 1
ρ2
t ) +
(
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2 d(V2(t)α2pi
− 1
ρ2
t )
+(α2pit)
− 1
ρ2 d
((
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2 (V2(t)
)
+ (V2(t))d
(
δ2Y
(2)
t )
1
ρ2α2pi
− 1
ρ2
t
)
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The dynamics of pi
− 1
ρi
t is needed next. By Ito’s lemma we get
dpi
− 1
ρi
t =
(
− 1
ρi
pi
− 1
ρi
−1
t µpi(t) +
1
2
1
ρi
(
1
ρi
+ 1)pi
−( 1
ρi
+2)
t σ
2
pi(t)
)
dt
− 1
ρi
pi
− 1
ρi
−1
t σpi(t) dBt. (41)
We now use the dynamics of the utility processes Vi(t) and the adjoint pro-
cesses Y it which can be found in Section 3 together with the dynamics for
pi
− 1
ρi
t given in (41).
Going back to the dynamics for the aggregate consumption process c, we
use the notation
ctµc(t) = c
(1)
t µ
(1)
c (t) + c
(2)
t µ
(2)
c (t)
and
ctσc(t) = c
(1)
t σ
(1)
c (t) + c
(2)
t σ
(2)
c (t)
This results in a stochastic differential equation for c. Using the expres-
sions given above for the optimal consumptions of the two agents c
(1)
t and
c
(2)
t respectively, this reduces to the following
dct = ctµc(t)dt+ ctσc(t)dBt ={
c
(1)
t
[− δ1
ρ1
+
1
2
γ1
ρ1
σ2V1(t) +
1
2
1
ρ1
(
1
ρ1
− 1)γ21σ2V1(t) +
1
2
γ1σ
2
V1
(t)
− 1
ρ1
(pi−1t µpi(t))+
1
2
1
ρ1
(
1
ρ1
+1)(pi−1t σpi(t))
2−γ1
ρ1
σ2V1(t)+
γ1 − ρ1
ρ21
(pi−1t σpi(t))σV1(t)
]
+c
(2)
t
[− δ2
ρ2
+
1
2
γ2
ρ2
σ2V2(t) +
1
2
1
ρ2
(
1
ρ2
− 1)γ22σ2V2(t) +
1
2
γ2σ
2
V2
(t)
− 1
ρ2
(pi−1t µpi(t))+
1
2
1
ρ2
(
1
ρ2
+1)(pi−1t σpi(t))
2−γ2
ρ2
σ2V2(t)+
γ2 − ρ2
ρ22
(pi−1t σpi(t))σV2(t)
]}
dt
+
{
c
(1)
t
[ρ1 − γ1
ρ1
)σV1(t)−
1
ρ1
(pi−1t σpi(t))
]
+c
(2)
t
[ρ2 − γ2
ρ2
σV2(t)−
1
ρ2
(pi−1t σpi(t))
]}
dBt
Using this representation and applying diffusion invariance, we obtain two
relationships from which we can determine pi−1t σpi(t) and pi
−1
t µpi(t) in terms
of the primitives of the economy. The first equation determines the diffusion
of the state price deflator: It is
−σpi(t)
pit
=
1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)
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where
ψ¯t :=
1
ρ1
(c(1)t
ct
)
+
1
ρ2
(c(2)t
ct
)
.
From this we obtain the risk premium of any risky asset, denoted R, as
follows
µR(t)− rt = 1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t)σR(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t)σR(t)
+
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)σR(t)
)
. (42)
This proves (33).
Turning to the equilibrium short rate, from the drift of the aggregate
consumption we obtain that
ψ¯t rt = ψ¯t(−pi−1t µpi(t)) =
((c(1)t
ct
) δ1
ρ1
+
(c(2)t
ct
) δ2
ρ2
)
+ µc(t)
−1
2
{(c(1)t
ct
) ρ1 − γ1
ρ1
γ1
ρ1 − 1
ρ1
σ2V1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)ρ2 − γ2
ρ2
γ2
ρ2 − 1
ρ2
σ2V2(t)
}
−
{1
2
(c(1)t
ct
) 1
ρ1
(
1
ρ1
+ 1)
1
ψ¯2t
(
σc(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)2
+
1
2
(c(2)t
ct
) 1
ρ2
(
1
ρ2
+ 1)
1
ψ¯2t
(
σc(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)2}
−
{(c(1)t
ct
)ρ1 − γ1
ρ21
1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t) +
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t) +
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)
σV1(t)
+
(c(2)t
ct
)ρ2 − γ2
ρ22
1
ψ¯t
(
σc(t)+
(c(1)t
ct
)γ1 − ρ1
ρ1
σV1(t)+
(c(2)t
ct
)γ2 − ρ2
ρ2
σV2(t)
)
σV2(t)
}
.
From this it follows that rt is given by (35).
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